Feedback — Week 2 Quiz
Question 1
Which of the following features do some DRE and optical scan voting machines have in common with personal computers?
Check all that apply.
Your Answer | Score | Explanation | |
---|---|---|---|
Upgradeable software | Correct | 0.25 | DREs often allow new software to be loaded on the system, through memory cards, or internal interfaces such as JTAG. |
Data Storage | Correct | 0.25 | Computers have hard disk drives and flash drives, and DREs often have some form of non-volatile memory such as flash drives. |
Printers | Correct | 0.25 | Many DREs use built-in printers to print a paper trail or audit log. |
Microsoft Windows operating system | Correct | 0.25 | Some DREs run on Windows CE, an embedded operating system of Microsoft Windows. |
Total | 1.00 / 1.00 |
Question 2
Optical scan machines are able to count votes perfectly because they are not prone to human counting error
Your Answer | Score | Explanation | |
---|---|---|---|
False | Correct | 1.00 | Computer voting machines, such as optical scan machines can in principle be tampered with to count incorrectly, and they are subject to human errors in the design and programming of the machine. Furthermore, optical scan machines may misread marks or malfunction in other ways. |
Total | 1.00 / 1.00 |
Question 3
In which of the following ways are DREs more secure than paper ballots?
Your Answer | Score | Explanation | |
---|---|---|---|
None of the other answers | Correct | 1.00 | Though DREs provide some nice properties (such as faster results), none of the other options of this question are correct (see specific explanations). |
Total | 1.00 / 1.00 |
Question 4
It is impossible for an outside attacker to tamper with a DRE’s internal circuitry…
Your Answer | Score | Explanation | |
---|---|---|---|
is a false statement; attackers can plausibly tamper with DREs’ internal circuits | Correct | 1.00 | |
Total | 1.00 / 1.00 |
Question 5
A DRE manufacturer decides to include a printer that records each vote cast on a continuous paper tape, where it can be checked by the voter, in order to allow future election audits.
Which of the following are potential problems with this approach?
Check all that apply.
Your Answer | Score | Explanation | |
---|---|---|---|
Voters might not verify that the tape reflects their actual vote, allowing the machine to print and record incorrect voter choices | Correct | 0.25 | |
Printing voter choices in order might violate ballot secrecy | Correct | 0.25 | |
It may allow voters to vote more than once | Correct | 0.25 | Adding a continuous paper tape does not change how voters are authenticated or prevented from double voting. |
It may allow corrupt poll workers to change the outcome of the election more easily | Correct | 0.25 | Paper tapes would make this more difficult, as now a corrupt poll worker would have to destroy or additionally tamper with the paper tape to match their tampering with the machine. |
Total | 1.00 / 1.00 |
Question 6
What are some potential advantages of DREs over paper ballots?
Check all that apply.
Your Answer | Score | Explanation | |
---|---|---|---|
DREs will work in all environmental conditions | Correct | 0.25 | DREs (like other electronics) can fail in hot, wet, or even cold conditions. |
DREs avoid the need to print ballots in advance | Correct | 0.25 | DREs don’t need pre-printed ballots. |
DREs do not require polling places | Correct | 0.25 | DREs still need to be placed in a polling place and watched by voting officials, much like the ballot box |
DREs are more secure than paper ballots | Correct | 0.25 | See question 3 |
Total | 1.00 / 1.00 |
Question 7
After a DRE has been banned from use in elections in a state, selling the machines as surplus may be dangerous because…
(Check all that apply)
Your Answer | Score | Explanation | |
---|---|---|---|
the DRE might reveal how people voted in past elections | Correct | 0.25 | Some DREs record logs that, if not erased completely, could allow attackers to reveal past voter’s choices using the time or order in which they were voted. |
it could help an attacker develop an attack on this machine for another state (or country) | Correct | 0.25 | In the US, states or municipalities individually decide which voting machines they will use, allowing one state to ban a machine, while another continues using it in elections. |
the attacker could change votes on the machine | Correct | 0.25 | The votes on the machine are not going to be used for any recounting or auditing, so this will have no effect on previous (or future) elections |
it will make chain voting easier | Correct | 0.25 | Chain voting applies to paper ballots |
Total | 1.00 / 1.00 |
Question 8
What are some problems with optical scan ballots?
Check all that apply
Your Answer | Score | Explanation | |
---|---|---|---|
They take far longer to count than traditional paper ballots | Correct | 0.25 | Initial counting is faster, auditing takes roughly the same amount of time as traditional paper ballots |
Users don’t always fill in the bubbles correctly, making it difficult for the scanner to read | Correct | 0.25 | See Lecture 3.2 for an example of users incorrectly filling in bubbles. |
They are more expensive to print than other kinds of ballots | Correct | 0.25 | Patent-encuberance aside, both are just paper ballots with ink in different places (as opposed to, e.g., pre-scored punched card ballots) |
They make chain voting easier than paper ballots | Correct | 0.25 | Committing chain voting using traditional paper ballots is about the same difficulty as when using optical scan ballots. |
Total | 1.00 / 1.00 |
Question 9
What does a Precinct-Count optical scan machine allow that a Central-Count optical scan machine does not?
Your Answer | Score | Explanation | |
---|---|---|---|
Notifying users of invalid ballots | Correct | 1.00 | Since the ballot is scanned in front of the voter, errors (such as unreadable ballots) can be corrected by the voter when using precinct-count optical scanners |
Total | 1.00 / 1.00 |
Question 10
Why isn’t it sufficient to perform a security analysis of a DRE to certify it secure for use in all future elections?
Check all that apply.
Your Answer | Score | Explanation | |
---|---|---|---|
Not finding security problems does not mean there aren’t any | Correct | 0.25 | Analysts may overlook problems. Real attacks might be more clever, better resourced, luckier, etc. |
Auditors won’t find anything that the developers didn’t find | Correct | 0.25 | Good auditors should be looking at code differently from how many developers look at their own code — whereas developers are often concerned with focusing on making their code work in the first place, auditors are searching for ways the system can fail at the hands of an adversary, which often involves a much different view of the system. |
The source code for the DRE is proprietary | Correct | 0.25 | While this is true for many DREs, it does not prevent auditors from cooperating with the company to receive access (by signing non-disclosure agreements, for example). |
The DRE might be running different software that has not been certified | Correct | 0.25 | An attacker or insider could give auditors one copy of code, and the machine another (possibly insecure or malicious) version. |
Total | 1.00 / 1.00 |
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